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Yapeswap — Zero-Quorum Governance Exploit + Malicious Registry ($21.9K)

Incident date Oct 25, 2026Last updated Nov 3, 2026

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Not RecoveredUnknownGovernance ExploitCluster: CAS-12-2026-W44

Estimated loss

$21.9K

Affected users

1
Group joining is coming soon.

Investigation

50%

Facts and investigation

Ledger

Attacker

Unidentified. No attacker address published.

Funds moved to

MISSING — not disclosed. Losses materialized as non-redeemable deposit shares.

Linked

Attacker address: MISSING. Contracts affected: YapeFactory (feeToSetter control), YapePair (deposit accounting), YapeWrapper (farm asset routing). WorkersUnion governance contract: quorum set to 0 (0.000055% voting power sufficient). Chain: MISSING — not identified in available sources.

Chronology

6 beats
  1. October 25, 2026 (exact time MISSING) — Attacker exploits a combination of governance flaw and malicious contract deployment on Yapeswap.

  2. Step 1: WorkersUnion governance contract has quorum = 0, allowing 0.000055% voting power to pass proposals. Attacker acquires feeToSetter permission on YapeFactory.

  3. Step 2: Attacker deploys a malicious Registry contract where latestVault() returns forged addresses, while vaults() returns legitimate vault addresses (split return to evade detection).

  4. Step 3: YapePair routes deposit transactions through the malicious Registry, counting them as farm assets without issuing redeemable shares to depositors.

  5. Result: ~$21,900 in deposits become non-redeemable. No official Yapeswap statement identified. No recovery announced.

  6. Technical analysis credit: SlowMist (cited by Phemex and CoinFomania).

Sources and coverage

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