Incident case file
Sign in to watchSubQuery Network — Settings Contract Missing Access Control
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Estimated loss
Victims identified
Investigation
Facts and investigation
Attacker: TODO — addresses not enumerated in published post-mortem
Timeline: April 12, 2026: Attacker deploys two ephemeral contracts on Base, abuses the absence of any owner/role guard on Settings.setBatchAddress() and Settings.setContractAddress(). Temporarily rewires the protocol StakingManager and RewardsDistributor entries to attacker-controlled helpers. 04:35 UTC: TX5 (small Treasury probe). 05:04 UTC: TX1 drains ~218M SQT from pooled Staking. 05:28 UTC: TX2 drains ~11.8M SQT additional. 06:05 UTC: TX4 drains ~22.8M SQT from RewardsBooster. TX3 drains 272 individual stakers/delegators. Total drain: 382,433,441 SQT (~$134,000) across 5 transactions. Same day: SubQuery team identifies issue, restores original contract addresses, deploys onlyOwner patch. April 13: Full disclosure and 100% compensation plan published.
Sources and coverage
- Articlesubquery.ghost.iohttps://subquery.ghost.io/subquery-network-security-incident-report/
- Articlex.comhttps://x.com/Defi_Nerd_sec/status/2043522897084629484
- Articledarknavy.orghttps://www.darknavy.org/web3/exploits/
- Articlecryip.cohttps://cryip.co/subquery-staking-contract-exploit-triggers-withdrawals-pause/
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