Projekt (GREEN/GOLD) Reward Vault — Flash Loan Reward-Logic Exploit

T-1 — Prior to the attack: 0x7bd736631afbe1d3795a94f60574f7fa0ae89347 sends 0.02 ETH to 0x61e7Ad696215688d274C729A4cD0FbbC88FC4f85, funding the attacker's deployer wallet. T0 — July 25, 2026 (single transaction, hash 0x90f40d3c3b60370f7287d51d972ef54596c46e98f21af91b03a4e84c5e410f64, block 25606412): the attacker deploys 15 contracts in one transaction, 13 of which self-destruct immediately after use to obscure the attack path and reduce gas cost. A flash loan of ~13,997.84 WETH is borrowed from Morpho and pushed sequentially through 13 Uniswap V2 memecoin pairs (including Kirby Inu, CMERGE, Infinity Token, Projekt Diamond/DIAMND, ApeBullInu, Beer-inu, Mimetic, NTENDO, ROTTSCHILD, Covir, Ganja, PEPETH, Fitcoin), using skim() on each pair to register fabricated 'purchase' events without genuine token swaps. DefimonAlerts confirmed: 'An unverified buy-to-earn reward vault credits an ETH allocation via the permissionless trackPurchase(buyer), which reads the buyer's token balance delta to size the reward, then pays it out with massWithdraw() -> msg.sender.transfer(alloc).' Because trackPurchase never verifies actual ETH spent, the fabricated skim events inflate the attacker's reward allocation arbitrarily. The flash loan is fully repaid to Morpho within the same transaction. The attacker then calls massWithdraw() to drain 300.70 ETH (~$561,202) from the vault's reward pool, sends 1 ETH to BuilderNet to keep the transaction out of the public mempool (avoiding front-running/MEV extraction), and forwards the remaining 300.70 ETH directly to 0x7bd736631afbe1d3795a94f60574f7fa0ae89347. No post-incident statement from the Projekt team has been identified; the attacker remains unattributed.