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DoinGud Diamond Contract Bid Reuse Exploit

Incident date Sep 22, 2026Last updated Oct 8, 2026

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ClosedPolygonBid-replay logic flawCluster: DOINGUD-POLY-2026-09

Estimated loss

$35.5K

Affected users

Number of affected users is not confirmed
Group joining is coming soon.

Investigation

100%

Facts and investigation

Ledger

Attacker

DoinGud Exploiter 1: 0xb8C717239BCACE558c3a8Dc471c16E07bF57a1Eb (PolygonScan-labeled)

Funds moved to

DoinGud Exploiter 2 (attack contract): 0xe588834AA3161a0720E8F6bf223748D6098a4B76 (PolygonScan-labeled), then swapped to QuickSwap and withdrawn

Linked

Diamond Contract (victim): 0xE3A161EdD679fC5ce2dB2316a4B6f7ab33a8eD6A. Vulnerable facet: 0x123aAFC8D0a07CE1A146E53aA899e77f21A2DDe1. DoinGud was a dormant project (inactive since 2023) at time of exploit, discovered independently by a whitehat researcher roughly a week before exploitation.

Chronology

1 beat
  1. At 05:15 UTC on September 22, 2026, an attacker exploited a bug in DoinGud's Diamond proxy contract where the acceptBid() function failed to clear a bid record after payout, allowing bid reuse. Using a flash loan equal to the contract's full USDC balance ($35,487), the attacker placed a bid on themselves and accepted it twice, draining the contract. The bug had been independently discovered by security researcher teddyctf approximately one week prior; due to DoinGud being a dead project with no active team to contact, responsible disclosure was not completed before the exploit occurred.

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